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Parole Revocation in Ohio
Ro bert L. Tuma *
T HE Varner CASE POSED a problem faced by probation officers
in many states.
While serving a one to fifteen year sentence for attempted
burglary, petitioner was paroled from the Ohio State Reforma-
tory.
Later, while petitioner was still on parole, he was arrested
and taken into custody. He then instituted habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in which he alleged that a parole officer of the Pardon
and Parole Commission filed, with the Sheriff of Summit County,
a form captioned "Order to Hold." 1
Petitioner claimed that he had not been given notice or
knowledge of any alleged violation of the conditions of his parole,
and further, that any finding that there had been such a violation
would be arbitrary and, in this case, an abuse of discretion. The
Court of Appeals found that the petitioner was lawfully im-
prisoned by the sheriff and dismissed the petition. The Supreme
Court of Ohio affirmed this decision.
2
In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court was confronted with
a problem which has raised apparent conflict with many authori-
ties outside the State of Ohio.3 Can the Pardon and Parole
Commission declare a paroled convict to be a parole violator
before the expiration of the maximum period of his sentence
without notice or hearing, according to t!'e laws of Ohio and the
Federal Constitution? 4 Also, is such ac-Ion by the Commission
* B.S.S., John Carroll University; Parole Officer, State of Ohio, Division of
Correction, Bureau of Probation and Parole; a Senior at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Form, "Order to Hold," State of Ohio, Dept. Mental Hyg. & Correction,
Bur. of Probation & Parole.
2 In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N. E. 2d 846 (1957).
3 See 29 A. L. R. 2d 1074-6. This annotation discusses the recurrent crimi-
nal problem of whether a convicted parolee who is legally at liberty under
a suspension of sentence or probation granted by the trial court or under
a parole or conditional pardon granted by the executive or by an ad-
ministrative agency vested with such power is entitled to notice and hear-
ing before revocation of such suspension of sentence or probation, parole,
or conditional pardon; in other words, are notice and hearing a procedural
requisite to revocation of such conditional liberty for breach of the terms
on which it was granted.
4 Supra, note 2 at 342.
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reviewable by habeas corpus proceedings, even though such
convict is returned to an institution because of such action? 5
The Court felt that such right of review would depend
heavily upon the interpretation of the applicable statutes.6 The
question of the constitutionality of the Commission's action was
brought forth when the Court quoted Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Escoe v. Zerbst (295 U. S. 490, 492, 55 S. Ct. 818, 79 L. Ed. 1566):
"Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace
to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such con-
ditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose." 7
The Ohio Court likened this observation of Justice Cardozo
to the parolee. The parolee is merely a convict at large by the
sovereign grace. During the process by which he had been re-
lieved of his freedom, the constitutional safeguards which form
the protective bulwark around the individual citizens' liberties
had been followed,8 and are not again available to him because
he is still a "convict" and has not yet been re-endowed with that
status classified as "citizen."
He has already been seized in a constitutional way, con-
fronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him, tried by
the jury of his peers secured to him by the Constitution, and,
5 Riggs v. Correction Department, Parole Board Division, 170 Ohio St.
347, 164 N. E. 2d 731 (1960). This very issue was to re-appear in the
Supreme Court three years later. In Feb., 1960, the Supreme Court held
that the action of the Pardon and Parole Commission in declaring peti-
tioner to be a parole violator was not reviewable in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings even though petitioner had been returned to the penitentiary be-
cause of such action.
6 Two sections of the Ohio Revised Code pertinent to the petitioner in this
case read:
Sec. 2965.01. As used in sections 2965.01 to * * * 2965.35, inclusive,
of the Revised Code:
(E) 'Parole' means the release from confinement in any state
penal or reformatory institution * * * by the pardon and parole com-
mission upon such terms * * * and for such period of time as shall
be prescribed by the pardon and parole commission in its published
rules and official minutes. A parolee so released shall be supervised
by the bureau of probation and parole. Legal custody of a parolee
shall remain in the department of mental hygiene and correction until
granted a final release by the pardon and parole commission.
(G) "Convict" means a person who has been convicted of a felony
under the laws of this state, whether or not actually confined in a
state penal or reformatory institution, unless he has been pardoned
or has served his sentence.
7 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566 (1935).
8 Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 S. 146 (1898); Ex parte Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41,
244 P. 2d 403 (1952); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 P. 1009 (1915); Guy
v. Utecht, 216 Minn. 255, 12 N. W. 2d 753 (1943).
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by them, convicted of crime and sentenced to punishment there-
for.9
In Ohio, prisoners placed on parole by the Ohio Pardon and
Parole Commission are required to abide by the laws governing
parole. These rules are provided by the Commission. While
on parole, the subject remains in the legal custody of the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene and Correction. The parolee is
under the supervision of the Bureau of Probation and Parole.
While on parole, he remains a prisoner of the State outside the
confines of the institution from which he was paroled. This
relationship is similar to that of a trusty of an institution.
The rules governing the parolee's freedom are more strin-
gent than the rules governing the average person. A parolee can
only change his residence or employment after consultation
with, and approval of, his parole officer. He is not permitted
to use, or possess, intoxicating liquors. He cannot leave the State
or even the County without express permission. He may not
marry without first securing the consent of his parole officer. 10
Other jurisdictions have arrived at different decisions than
the Ohio Court did in this case. Many times this is the result
of statutes which exist in many states covering revocation pro-
cedure. While about half of the states expressly deny the right
to a hearing in such cases," many foreign courts base their
conclusion on the fact that the conditionally freed individual
is entitled to his freedom, and, as such, is possessed of a right
which can only be forfeited by breaching the condition of its
grant. Forfeiture without the opportunity for a hearing is then
deemed to be a violation of constitutionally guaranteed due
process. 1 2
9 Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 285 S. Ct. 372, 52 L. Ed. 582 (1908).
10 "Parole Rules as Provided by the Ohio Pardon and Parole Commission
and as Required by the Bureau of Probation and Parole," Ohio Dept.
Mental Hyg. & Correction.
11 States which do have statutes covering revocation procedure are: Ala.,
Colo., Fla., Ga., Ia., La., Md., Mo., Mont., Nebr., N. Mex., N. C., Okla., Ore.,
Tenn., S. Dak., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo. See: H. Weihofen, Revoking Pro-
bation, Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 J. Crim. Law 600-23 (1942).
12 Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. 2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941). (Conditional par-
don.) Compare with Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 63 S. E. 2d 402 (1951)
(Notice and hearing required to revoke suspended sentence); Gross v. Huff,
208 Ga. 392, 67 S. E. 2d 124 (1951) (Notice and hearing required to revoke
probation sentence); with Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S. E. 380
(1937) (Notice and hearing not required to revoke parole). Also, State v.
Theisen, 167 Ohio St. 119, 146 N. E., 2d 865 (1957), (Neither judicial inquiry
nor notice and hearing needed to terminate probation).
Jan., 1962
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The Ohio Court dismissed the idea that the legislative
intent supported an inference that there should be a hearing
before a prisoner on parole be declared a parole violator.
The Court said that ". . no intent should be recognized
unless it has been clearly expressed." 13 This statement provided
the impetus for some needed changes in the Ohio Statutes. 4
Because of the misconstrued interpretation and strained con-
struction relating to parole in general, Amended Substitute
Housebill Number 671 was enacted by the General Assembly of
the State of Ohio.15 The purpose of this act was generally to
amend those sections which opened the doors to litigation and
to clarify those sections of the Ohio Revised Code which left
room for misinterpretation of various areas of the parole system.
Specifically, this act enlarged the membership of the Pardon
and Parole Commission, it changed certain procedures of the
Commission and it established a Bureau of Probation and Parole
in the Division of Correction of the Department of Mental Hy-
giene and Correction.'1
Regarding the problem of revocation of parole presented in
the immediate case, Section 2965.21 was amended to read as
follows:
Whenever any parole officer has reasonable cause to
believe that any parolee under the supervision of the bureau
of probation and parole has violated the terms and conditions
of his pardon or parole, such parole officer may arrest such
parolee, or may order any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable,
or police officer to make such arrest. A person so arrested
... shall be confined in the jail or detention home of the
county in which he is arrested until released . . . on parole
or removed to the proper institution. . . . Upon making
such arrest the parole officer shall, as soon as practicable
thereafter, notify the superintendent of the bureau of pro-
bation and parole, in writing, that such parolee has been ar-
rested and is in custody and submit in detail an appropriate
report of the reason for such arrest. The superintendent
shall thereupon make an appropriate recommendation to
the pardon and parole commission and shall submit a copy
13 Supra, note 2.
14 "The Amended Substitute House Bill No. 671," booklet. See footnote 15.
15 Ibid. Passed June 22, 1959. Approved July 2, 1959.
16 Section I of the Amended Substitute House Bill No. 671 amended these
sections of the Ohio R. C.: 2301.32, 2951.05, 2965.01, 2965.02, 2965.03, 2965.05,
2965.07, 2965.17, 2965.20, 2965.21 and 5119.04. Section 2; repealed the follow-
ing sections of the Ohio R. C.: Sections 2301.32, 2951.05, 2965.01, 2965.02,
2965.03, 2965.05, 2965.07, 2965.17, 2965.20, 2965.21 and 5119.04.
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of the report of the parole officer to the pardon and parole
commission which shall, in a reasonable time after receipt
thereof, determine whether or not such parolee should be
declared a violator of the terms and conditions of his par-
don or parole.
In the event a parolee is declared to be a violator of
the conditions of his pardon the commission shall forthwith
transmit to the governor its recommendation . . . concern-
ing . . . such violation and such violator shall be retained
in custody until the governor issues an order concerning
such violation.
17
Statutes not expressly requiring or dispensing with notice
and hearing have been interpreted in accord with the particu-
lar jurisdiction's determination of the applicability of the due
process requirement.'8
The Ohio Court held that the pertinent statutory provisions
clearly indicated a legislative intent not to burden the parole
process with such hearings.
The Court took a realistic and practical outlook in backing
their reasoning when they said, "In many instances, potential
witnesses justifiably are fearful of testifying publicly against a
paroled convict, and therefore . . . it may be necessary for the
Commission to rely upon secret investigations." 19
Another very practical consideration to support the Courts'
holding is that upon receipt of notice informing a parolee that
his parole was about to be revoked, he might leave the juris-
diction.20
This writer knows, from personal experience, the powerful
disciplinary force which the threat of potential confinement can
17 Ibid.
18 Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S. E. 380 (1937). A hearing was not
required because that statute by its express terms states that, ". . . a
parolee remains within the legal custody and control of the prison com-
mission, a plain and clear abuse; if decision arrived at fraudulently, cor-
ruptly, or by mere personal caprice, was here, however, said to be subject
to habeas corpus that such action might be reviewed."
In U. S. ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F. 2d 94 (4th Cir. 1939),
the Supreme Court said ". .. the right of a parolee to the writ of habeas
corpus is determined by statute. In legal effect, parolee is imprisoned and
there is no question but that the prisoner is restrained of his liberty. Yet
a parolee is in the 'legal custody and under the control of the Attorney
General.' This statutory declaration that the restraint is legal removes
from the parolee the 'privilege of the writ' and obviates judicial inquiry
by habeas corpus."
19 State ex rel. McQueen v. Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 14 S. 2d 557 (1943).
20 Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky. 612, 126 S. W. 2d 1056
(1939).
Jan., 1962
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have on the parolee. If the parolee knew that the parole officer
would be burdened with the formalities necessary for a judicial
inquiry, the effectiveness of this method would be greatly di-
minished.2 1
The Court also considered the fact that the resulting bur-
dens of administration from a judicial inquiry would undoubted-
ly discourage the Commission from granting many paroles that
it would otherwise grant. In marginal cases, a parole board
would mutually hesitate to grant paroles in view of the extra
work and added responsibility on the board.22
It is a principle of criminology that perfect adjustment of a
person to society would involve complete conformity of the per-
son's behavior with the prevailing customs and standards. Com-
plete conformity rarely occurs, and indeed, is impossible un-
less there is a unified system of standards. Even in small, stable,
homogeneous societies, such as primitive communities, some un-
conformity appears. In complex, civilized societies, non-conform-
ity abounds. People do not automatically obey either the mores
or laws. They learn to obey through a long series of social ex-
periences.23
So then, the law must be more than Federal and State sanc-
tion of rules and regulations governing human conduct. Rather,
it must also be an attempt to adjust human conduct for the se-
curity of the community and the individual involved.
It is for these reasons that this writer applauds the decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court. Had it taken a contrary view, the
primary purposes of parole, namely (1) the protection of society,
and, (2) the rehabilitation of the offender, might have been set
back by years.
21 Contrary to many of the theoretical principles of rehabilitation, this
most practical threat of re-imprisonment is in many instances the only
motivation for deterring the parolee from, in some way, violating his
parole.
22 Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596, 131 N. W. 914 (1911).
23 Cavan, Criminology, 630 (1948).
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